This paper is a defense of sorts of the Iraqi constitution, arguing that the language used in it was wisely designed to allow some level of flexibility, such that highly divided political forces could find incremental solutions to the deep rooted sources of division that have plagued Iraqi society since its inception. That Iraq has found itself in such dreadful political circumstances since constitutional ratification is therefore not a function of the open ended constitutional bargain, but rather of the failure of Iraqi legal and political elites to make use of the space that the constitution provided them to develop such incremental resolutions.
Haider A. Hamoudi,
Notes in Defense of the Iraq Constitution,
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law
Available at: https://scholarship.law.pitt.edu/fac_articles/443
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