Due Process, Jurisdiction and a Hague Judgments Convention

Authors

Ronald A. Brand, University of Pittsburgh School of LawFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

1999

Abstract

Due process is perhaps one of the most misunderstood concepts in the U.S. legal system, especially as it appears to those outside the United States. For lawyers trained in the United States, 'due process' becomes a phrase with special meaning resulting from the study of a number of judicial decisions, especially those of the U.S. Supreme Court. For lay persons, and for lawyers from other countries, discussions of 'due process' may not always provide a clear understanding of what that phrase means in the U.S. legal system. This paper discusses the historical development of the concept of due process in U.S. law, particularly as it relates to issues of jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in U.S. courts. Like many aspects of amendments to the United States Constitution, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide limitations on the federal and state governments. This paper provides a historical look at the term as applied in U.S. jurisdiction decisions, and compares that approach with the due process implications of jurisdictional issues under the Brussels Convention in Europe. It also explains how due process limitations on jurisdiction result in limitations on the negotiating authority of the United States in the context of multilateral conventions on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments.

Recommended Citation

Ronald A. Brand, Due Process, Jurisdiction and a Hague Judgments Convention, 60 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 661 (1999).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.pitt.edu/fac_articles/312