Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2024
Abstract
The rights of transgender youth and their families have increasingly come under attack in recent years. In addition to barring transgender youth from participation on sports teams, from accessing bathrooms that match their gender identity, and from receiving gender-affirming healthcare, states are increasingly restricting speech and expression related to transgender issues. Courts and scholars have begun addressing the First Amendment implications of some of these restrictions, including the removal of books related to transgender issues; restrictions upon teachers' classroom speech regarding such issues; school discipline imposed upon students whose social transition includes forms of gender expression that differ from their assigned sex at birth; and bans upon doctors providing minors with referrals for gender-affirming care. Such attacks are likely to only accelerate given the success of some right-wing politicians in making anti-trans messaging a cornerstone of their 2024 election strategies and the strong likelihood that the Supreme Court in the pending U.S. v. Skrmetti case will uphold states' restrictions on gender-affirming care for minors.
This Article breaks new ground in two respects. First, it focuses on a First Amendment issue that has not yet been addressed by the courts or in the scholarly literature: namely, whether the Supreme Court's school speech cases would permit states or public school officials to restrict student speech advising a peer to obtain forms of gender-affirming care that are unlawful to minors in the state where the speech occurs. This Article is also the first to apply the history of the battles over free speech regarding slavery and of the Nation's Second Founding following the Civil War to analyze the First Amendment implications of restrictions upon student speech relating to transgender issues.
Under the classic framework of Tinker v. Des Moines School District, student speech cannot be restricted unless it causes or poses a significant risk of material and substantial disruption to the learning environment. The Supreme Court's more recent school speech cases, however, have granted greater leeway for restrictions on student speech. Opponents of gender-affirming care for minors are therefore likely to seek to exploit the Court's post-Tinker jurisprudence to justify restricting or punishing student speech advocating that a peer seek gender-affirming care. This Article argues that the Court's post-Tinker school speech cases cannot and should not be read to justify greater restrictions upon such speech than would otherwise be permissible under Tinker. This Article further argues that extending the Court's post-Tinker cases to allow the government to punish student speech advocating that a peer receive gender-affirming care would violate the right to freedom of speech secured at great cost by our Nation's Second Founding.
Recommended Citation
William M. Carter Jr.,
"Trans Talk" and the First Amendment,
working paper
(2024).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.pitt.edu/fac_articles/596
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